Since that fabled Friday night, when the Magpies summoned a special effort to overcome a 21-point, third-quarter deficit in a low scoring preliminary final, these birds have flown in different directions.

The Hawks have eclipsed Geelong as the competition standard bearer - consecutive grand finals for one flag and counting - while the Magpies have headed south for their winters.

Collingwood hasn't beaten Hawthorn since Ball's snap, and it is very long odds to change that pattern in the final-round game. If the Hawks have less to gain - they will likely play Geelong next week, win or lose - Collingwood has far fewer cattle, as the Westpac Centre has become a virtual MASH unit.

But injuries should not obscure the extent of the gulf that has opened up between these powerhouse clubs on the field.

There are various reasons why the Hawks rose and the Pies fell; in part, this was cyclical. Collingwood has lost the majority of its 2010-11 side, some traded for picks, others pushed into retirement. Hawthorn, which had disappointed in 2009 and 2010,  was better positioned for a second coming.

Critics of Nathan Buckley will finger the Collingwood coach, less seasoned and innovative than Alastair Clarkson, as responsible for his team falling behind the Hawks. But the extent to which coaching is responsible is always difficult to measure.

Personnel is always the first place to look, and the most dramatic disparity between these clubs lies in the mature talent that each has acquired for short-term needs.

Ball's goal, indeed, was a symbolic moment in this way: it was almost the last time - a Darren Jolly 2012 final against West Coast excepted - that a Collingwood recruit from another club would make such a telling contribution in a big game.

At the close of 2011, Hawthorn would acquire Jack Gunston, adding to the Hawks' remarkable collection of mature recruits - Shaun Burgoyne, Josh Gibson, David Hale and the since retired Brent Guerra having been instrumental in the 2013 flag, along with Brian Lake.

Lake, playing out time at Whitten Oval, would create a new template for the mature recruit - the twilight top-up, a player acquired from a team at the other end of the ladder.

Hawthorn's objective was to successfully renovate its list with a mix of draftees and mature recruits, albeit Gunston was still on P-plates. The seasoned players lessened the load on the new talent, such as Liam Shiels, Luke Breust, Isaac Smith and Bradley Hill.

Collingwood, conversely, was afflicted with a tight salary cap after 2011 - a success legacy. This constraint meant the Pies eschewed the expensive mature player and looked for the cheap recruit - via free agency - while making untried youth the priority.

Indeed, by the end of 2012, Collingwood had embarked upon a path - perhaps only semi-intentional - of what you might call "de-contending", of withdrawing from the short-term premiership race in order to build a team that could win it in the future. Buckley and his list manager Derek Hine had identified that what they had was no longer premiership-calibre.

Since 2012, Collingwoood has effectively swapped Chris Dawes for Tim Broomhead, Sharrod Wellingham for Brodie Grundy, Dale Thomas for Matt Scharenberg,  and Heath Shaw for Taylor Adams. Assuming Scharenberg recovers, these deals should put the Pies in a better position after 2015.

Collingwood's problem was that, unlike the Hawks, it couldn't land the same quality of short-term recruit to support the incoming kids. Quinten Lynch and Jesse White haven't cut the mustard, nor has Clinton Young. Patrick Karnezis remains an unknown quantity.

Hawthorn's other advantage was in adapting to the next trend in football evolution. The Hawks had the foot skills and natural goalkicking capacity to pierce the congestion and defensive mechanisms that had seen Collingwood prosper under Mick Malthouse. Both Clarkson and Buckley had foreseen this next phase - of kicking skills and offensive capability becoming what separated sides.

The difference was that Hawthorn found the method - and personnel - to adapt.